Analyzing Populism Through The Lens of The Yellow Vest Movement
The Yellow Vest movement
(YVM) arose in France in the autumn of 2018, paralyzing France’s major cities.
Initially a protest against increasing fuel costs, the movement soon grew
traction and rallied several hundred thousand demonstrators in the ensuing
months. In its preliminary stage, it was backed by as much as three-fourths of
the French populace[1].
Other
causes were soon added to the rising fuel prices, and the YVM evolved into a
protest movement concerned with a wide range of issues ranging from
socioeconomic injustice, austerity politics, and working conditions, to
democratic reform, corruption criticism, and centralization politics. The
YVM's activities and popular support had waned by the spring of 2019, while
fragments of the movement are still active today.
The YVM has been labelled
a populist social movement by multiple scholars[2] [3] [4]. This statement, on the
other hand, is frequently said nonchalantly and without a definite explanation
of the term. The word populism has been disputed, misinterpreted,
and used in reference to a diverse variety of movements and beliefs[5]. The political scientist
Will Brett characterised it as “a classic example of a stretched concept,
pulled out of shape by overuse and misuse”[6], while the political
scientist Paul Taggart has said of populism that it is “one of the most
widely used but poorly understood political concepts of our time”[7]. This
term was coined in concurrence with the Populist Party in the late 1800s and
has since been employed to a number of politicians, groups, and movements,
often contemptuously by adversaries.
Numerous definitions of
populism have been used in political science and other social sciences, with
some experts advising that the term be dropped entirely. Therefore, it appears that a full examination
of the YVM's populist nature is still required. This research project attempts
to address this requirement by achieving the following: First, an analysis of
whether the YVM’s most significant political claims, as formulated in Liste
des 42 revendications des Gilets Jaunes dated 29 November 2018, fit
Paris Aslanidis’ discursive definition of Populism and Social Movements (PSMs).
Aslanidis is opted as a frame of reference as he is one of the few academicians
within the field of populism studies who is concerned with PSMs[8].
Thus, and second, a case
against a discursive description of populism, using the YVM as a case in point
is presented. A discursive reasoning views populism as a logic of articulation that
undesirably describes the “people” through its opposition against the “elite,”
and contends that this logic is to be evaluated separately from political
substance[9] [10] [11]. In contrast, it is argued
that such a reading of the YVM ignores the reality that the movement's demands are
directed at a demographic assemblage that shares common interests due to distinctive
political opportunity structures and changing class structures in
postcapitalist societies.
It can be discerned how a populist frame is created in response to societal institutions and political circumstances by studying a movement's political essence, which Aslanidis' discursive technique prevents him from doing. Instead, a theory of PSMs should be inspired by frame theory's dual focus on political and economic institutions on the one hand, and human agency, framing, and collective identity on the other, a dichotomoy that discursive approach to populism lacks.
Etymology And Terminology
Populism emerged as a
form of self-designation, being utilised by members of the People's Party
active in the United States during the late 19th century[12]. In the Russian Empire
during the same period, a wholly different group referred to itself as the narodniki,
which has often been mistranslated into English as populists, causing more
confusion over the term[13] [14]. The Russian and American
groups differed in several areas, and the fact that they shared a name was
fortuitous. In the 1920s, the term entered the French language, where it was
used to characterise a group of writers showing sympathy for ordinary people[15].
Although the term originated
as a self-designation, much of the misinterpretation around it arises from the
fact that it has rarely been used in this way, with few political personalities
publicly proclaiming themselves as “populists”[16]. As highlighted by the
political scientist Margaret Canovan, “there has been no self-conscious
international populist movement which might have attempted to control or limit
the term's reference, and as a result those who have used it have been able to
attach it a wide variety of meanings”[17]. Thus, it differs from
other political concepts, such as “socialism” or “conservatism”, which have
been widely used as self-designations by individuals who have then offered
their own, internal explanations of the phrase. Instead, it bears
characteristics with phrases such as “far left”, “far right”, or “extremist”,
which are regularly used in political dialogues but rarely as
self-designations.
In
corporate-owned media, the term “populism” has often been confounded with other
notions like demagoguery, and often presented as something to be "feared
and discredited"[18]. It has often been employed
to movements that are regarded to be outside the political establishment or a
threat to democracy[19].
The political scientists
Yves Mény and Yves Surel stated that "populism" has become “a
catchword, particularly in the media, to designate the newborn political or
social movements which challenge the entrenched values, rules and institutions
of democratic orthodoxy.” Typically, the phrase is usually used against others,
especially in a negative manner to disparage opponents. Some of those who have
regularly been referred to as “populists” in a pejorative sense have
subsequently embraced the term while striving to divest it of negative
connotations[20].
The French far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen for example was often accused
of populism and ultimately retorted by claiming that “Populism precisely
means taking into account the people's viewpoint. Have people the right, in a
democracy, to hold an opinion? If that is the case, then yes, I am a populist.”
[21]Similarly, on being
created in 2003, the centre-left Lithuanian Labour Party proclaimed: “We are
and will be labelled populists.”[22]
Use in Academia
Until the 1950s, use of the term populism
was limited mostly to historians examining the People's Party, but in 1954 the
US sociologist Edward Shils wrote an article proposing populism as a phrase to
capture anti-elite movements in US society more broadly. Following on from
Shils' article, during the 1960s the expression “populism” became widely
popular among sociologists and other researchers in the social sciences[23].
A Conference on Populism
was held at the London School of Economics in 1967, but the participants were
unable to agree on a clear, single term. As a result of this scholarly
interest, the field of "populism studies" was born. Interest in the
subject expanded rapidly: between 1950 and 1960 about 160 publications on
populism emerged, whereas between 1990 and 2000 that number was over 1500[24]. From 2000–2015, roughly
95 papers and books featuring the term “populism” were categorised each year by
Web of Science. In 2016, it expanded to 266; in 2017, it was 488, and in 2018,
it was 615[25].
Taggart maintained that
this academic interest was not consistent but came in “bursts” of inquiry that
reflected the political situations of the period[26]. Canovan stated that “if
the notion of populism did not exist, no social scientist would deliberately invent
it; the term is far too ambiguous for that”[27]. From reviewing how the term “populism” had
been employed, she claimed that seven different varieties of populism might be
discerned. Three of these were varieties of “agrarian populism”, these included
farmers' radicalism, peasant movements, and intellectual agrarian socialism.
The remaining four types
of "political populism" were populist dictatorship, populist
democracy, reactionary populism, and politicians' populism. She acknowledged
that these were “analytical constructs” and that “real-life examples may well
overlap several categories”, adding that no single political movement fitted
into all seven categories. In this approach, Canovan viewed of populism as a
family of connected concepts rather than as a single concept in itself. The
misunderstanding around the phrase has caused some researchers to argue that it
should be discarded by scholarship.
In opposition to this
view, the political scientists Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser
remarked that “while the frustration is understandable, the term populism is
too central to debate about politics from Europe to the Americas to simply do
away with.[28]”
Similarly, Canovan stated that the phrase “does have comparatively clear and
definite meanings in a number of specialist areas” and that it “provides a
pointer, however shaky, to an interesting and largely unexplored area of
political and social experience”[29].
The political scientists
Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell argued that “if carefully defined, the
term “populism” can be used profitably to help us understand and explain a wide
array of political actors. The political scientist Ben Stanley stated that “although
the meaning of the term has proven controversial in the literature, the
persistence with which it has recurred suggests the existence at least of an
ineliminable core: that is, that it refers to a distinct pattern of ideas.”[30]
Political scientist David
Art says that the idea of populism combines together different phenomena in an
unhelpful manner, and ultimately obscures and legitimises figures who are more
completely identified as nativists and authoritarians[31]. Although academic definitions
of populism have changed, most of them have concentrated on the premise that it
should mention some type of relationship between “the people” and “the elite” and
that it included taking an anti-establishment posture.
Beyond that, different
researchers have underlined different elements that they seek to utilise to
characterise populism. These discrepancies have occurred both inside specific
academic disciplines and among distinct disciplines, ranging for instance among
scholars focused on different locations and different historical times[32].
Aslandis’ Frame Theory in the Populist Approach and
PSMs
The fact that populism is
famously difficult to define has almost become an academic cliché. Populism is
characterised as an ideology, a tactic, a mode of discourse, or a political
style, among other things. According to some academics, populism is a
phenomenon that exclusively exists on the right side of the political spectrum[33], while other scholars
believe that it is solely a part of the left-wing politics[34]. Aslanidis, following in
the footsteps of Ernesto Laclau (2007) and the Essex School, claims that
populism is best defined as:
“[. . .] a discourse,
invoking the supremacy of popular sovereignty to claim that corrupt elites are defrauding
“the People” of their rightful political authority. It becomes an anti-elite
discourse in the name of the sovereign People.”[35]
According to Aslanidis,
populism is too fluid and diverse to be classified as an ideology. Furthermore,
he contends that classifying populism as an ideology reduces it to a binary
choice rather than a spectrum, increasing the possibility of scholars making
normative judgments about which political actors should be labelled as
populists. They contend that populism should be quantified by examining
populist characteristics in a political actor's textual production:
“To seize and measure populism, it has
been found sufficient to meticulously analyze the discourse of political actors
and see if discursive elements of exalting the “noble People” and condemning
“corrupt elites” in the name of popular sovereignty are there, and how much of them.”[36]
Aslanidis uses frame
theory to see populist discourse as “a collective action frame rather than a
type of ideology” and sees frames as “schemata of interpretation” that allow
users to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” complicated occurrences in
daily life, according to Erving Goffmann's description. He encourages his
readers to view populism “as a strategic meaning-making device employed by
social movement entrepreneurs in their struggle to maximise support from the
wider audience” by describing it as a collective action frame.
PSMs differ from other
types of social movements in two ways, according to Aslanidis[37]. First and foremost, PSMs
do not claim to represent a specific social group, such as women, immigrants,
or LGBTQ+ people. PSMs, on the other hand, claim to speak for “the people”,
while slamming the “corrupt elite.” Second, PSMs create a discourse that is not
restricted to specific political concerns, but rather aims to transform and
reconstruct an entire political system in order to better serve the “pure
people's” desire.
The PSMs are defined by a
language in which disparities between demographic groups and occasionally
competing interests are ignored and trumped by antagonism between the “pure
people” and the “corrupt elite.” PSMs, according to Aslanidis, include
anti-austerity movements that arose in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis. These were characterised by entrepreneurs who:
“[. . .] deliberately
engaged in populist framing when they saw that this specific type of adversarial
framing could seamlessly accommodate the various grievances out there and give birth
to a collective subject as a springboard for concerted action against
established authority”[38]
Aslanidis contends that
what distinguishes PSMs from “old” and “new” social movements is their framing,
which has been carefully chosen by major actors in a movement in order to
better form an effective collective identity[39]. He cites anti-austerity
movements as instances of PSMs,[40] [41] [42] which were defined by
their left-leaning, progressive agendas and calls for economic redistribution,
transparency, and democratic reform. His definition, however, does not include
progressive, left-wing initiatives such as those launched in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis.
Aslanidis' definition, on
the other hand, is rigorously formalistic, discursive, and anti-essentialist:
political entrepreneurs from both sides of the political spectrum can utilise “people”
as a strategic meaning-making advice, and it can be tied to any type of
ideology.
The YVM was founded in
the fall of 2018, 18 months after President Emmanuel Macron through his
movement of La République en Marche! was elected, significantly altering the
French political scene and weakening two of the country's major parties, the
Parti socialiste and Les Républicains. Before proposing to raise the gasoline
tax, which triggered the YVM, the Macron government had previously implemented
some unpopular measures, including a repeal of the wealth tax[1] and labour law
flexibilization[2].
Macron, who predominantly
appealed to an urban, well-off, and highly educated electorate during his
presidential campaign, was quickly branded “the president of the rich”[3]. After a video surfaced in
which Macron claimed that France exhausts “crazy money” (un pognon de dingue)
on social-welfare programmes that “only keep people poor,” the backlash grew
when he told an unemployed man in another video, “I can cross the street and
find you a job”[4].
Macron's approval ratings
declined from 62% in 2017 to 31% in early 2018[5]. Subsequently, in October,
a petition opposing the proposed fuel tax gained traction, resulting in the
YVM. The movement quickly gained widespread public support, with more than
300,000 people attending the inaugural demonstration on November 17, 2018, in
addition to roundabout occupations. The weekly protests continued in December,
but they grew progressively engulfed in violence and vandalism, and by the
beginning of 2019, public support and the number of demonstrators had dwindled.
President Macron hence introduced
a new project, le great débat and public town-hall meetings where citizens may
voice their grievances with elected representatives in December 2018 [6]. The administration opted
not to levy the fuel tax that provoked the first protest and instead hiked the
minimum wage by €100.
Macron, on the other
hand, did not reinstate the contentious wealth tax. Since its inception, the
YVM has triggered a lively academic debate, owing to some unique and relatively
uncommon features such as a high percentage of female participants, first-time
demonstrators, and participants who state that they do not identify with the
traditional left–right political gamut.
Most participants had a
monthly income lower than the national median. Workers, employees, artisans,
and merchants, as well as residents of rural and peri urban areas, were
overrepresented in the YVM compared to the general population[7]. The movement's stress on
heterogeneity and horizontality, as evidenced by its refusal to choose leaders
or spokespersons, is another contentious aspect. As a result, it is tough to
ascertain the true political views of the Yellow Vest Movement.
Nonetheless, a
considerable majority of the YVM's participants have unquestionably endorsed
some of the movement's main objectives, which have been recited and rewritten
on numerous vests and placards, in online forums, and in public meetings. These
demands are primarily motivated by dissatisfaction with political elites and
current democratic institutions, criticism of increasingly difficult
socioeconomic and working conditions, and the demand for the establishment of a
citizens' initiative referendum.
As the main corpus for an
analysis of the political views of the movement, this research utilised the
Liste des 42 revendications des Gilets Jaunes published by the YVM before
l'acte III (their third protest rally) in December 2018 as this list of demands
to be the closest one can get to an official programme for the YVM. The 42
demands were formulated through surveys on the YVM's largest Facebook page, La
France en colère, as well as many provincial YVM groups, before being
distributed to politicians and media outlets[8].
The list was created as
part of an effort by central members of the YVM to coordinate the movement in
order to “concretize the demands expressed by millions of French people”. As a
result of this endeavour, eight "messengers" were chosen by 44
administrators of YVM's Facebook groups[9]. 30,000 people were
involved in the creation of the list, according to these messengers, and the 42
demands received the most support.
In late November 2018,
two of these “messengers,” Priscilla Ludovsky and Eric Drouet, presented a list
to the minister of ecological transition, François de Rugy, that mainly
overlapped with the 42 demands[10]. Since then, the 42
demands have been referenced in the French media and by academics[11].
The list includes
suggestions ranging from broad societal reform initiatives to more specific
issues such as a call for a maximum of 25 students in education courses. Suggestions
for economic change are the most diverse, including calls for a fairer income
tax system, an increase in the minimum wage from €1218 to €1300 net per month,
and a maximum national monthly wage of €15,000.
Furthermore, the YVM wished
to reduce the number of workers on fixed-term contracts (so-called CDD—contrats
à durée déterminée), create jobs for the unemployed, and end austerity policies
by “paying back the debt without taking money from the poor and the less poor,
but from the 80 billion lost in fiscal fraud.” The other major priority on the
list is democratic reform. The implementation of a citizen initiative
referendum, a change in the electoral timetable, and the adoption of a median
pay for elected officials are among the recommendations.
In addition, the YVM has several
demands that align with a protectionist political and economic agenda, such as
higher taxes on international companies like Google and Amazon, the prohibition
of postal work, and the return of asylum-seekers whose applications have been
denied to their home country. Finally, the rural and peri urban interests of
France are addressed. The YVM intends to prioritise small enterprises in villages
and city centres, prohibit delocalization, improve road construction and
maintenance, and prevent public services from being shut down in rural and peri
urban areas.
Our goal is to examine
the construction of identity in the YVM's requests, determine which clusters of
the populace the YVM claims to represent, and compare it to Aslanidis'
definition. According to Aslanidis, analysing identity creation is an important
element of studying PSMs:
““Identity talk”
reflects a socially constructed interactional process between movement insiders
and outsiders. Exploring identity and adversarial framing strategies in detail
is necessary if we are to understand how activists collectively perceived
themselves through their manifestos and how this subsequently influenced the
portrayal of their enemies.”[12]
As previously stated,
this description of PSMs suggests that the “in-group” in such a movement's
vocabulary is “the people” in its whole, irrespective of nationality, class,
sex, or background, and that the “out-group” is the “corrupt elite”:
“In populist
mobilization, the end result of identity work is the collective identity of
“the People as sovereign,” which functions as the primary mobilizing factor. [.
. .] participants are empowered by anchoring their diagnosis of the situation
upon the legitimizing values of majority rule and popular sovereignty, which no
opposing agent can carelessly defy without being labelled undemocratic. This
identity is a closely guarded symbolic asset for PSMs, and no secondary
attachment is allowed to interfere, since competing identities can potentially
apply centrifugal pressure or uncover intramural fault lines.”[13]
This definition hence implies that a PSM's language emphasises the contrast between the “moral people” and the “corrupt elite,” whereas secondary attachments, such as ethnic, economic, or other, are typically ignored in the discourse of these movements. It is therefore explored if this is the case for the YVM by doing qualitative content analysis on the 42 demands, and thus whether Aslanidis' concept of PSMs is applicable to the YVM.
Aslanidis'
characterisation of PSMs has a certain degree of duality to it, as indicated
above, and the first component addresses the question of whom groups the
movement claims to represent. Qualitative content analysis is employed in this
paper to see if Aslanidis' second criterion for a PSM, that the movement does
not confine itself to exclusive political problems but rather seeks to restore
democracy by restoring people's sovereignty, is an accurate description of the
YVM. The aim of this particular chapter is to analyse the discursive definition
of populism and PSMs with regards the Yellow Vest Movement.
The
YVM's assertions are broad and include a wide range of political issues in
France. Indeed, the YVM's proposals for a réferendum d’initiative citoyenne
(RIC) and a parliamentary election two years into a presidential term reflect
the party's desire to re-establish public sovereignty. The criticism of
economic and political elites, as well as the desire for the restoration of
public sovereignty, are common denominators in these demands; in other words,
the two essential aspects in Aslanidis' descriptions of populism and PSMs[14].
The
yellow vests position themselves as representatives of a “pure people”
demanding concession from the “corrupt elite” in their language. The use of the
pronoun nos (our) makes this rhetorical production of a “group” and an “out-group”
very evident:
“Give comfort to our
elderly. It is forbidden to make money on the elderly. The grey gold, that’s over.
The era of grey well-being begins”
In this scenario, one
finds a discursive creation of “the people and their elderly” as a “group” and
a discursive conception of a “out-group,” namely, an elite accused of profiting
off the elderly. When the YVM expresses their desire for “[..] the BIG
[MacDonalds, Google, Amazon, Carrefour, etc.] to pay BIG and the small
[artisans, small and medium businesses] to pay little,” the “group's”
critique of the “out-group” is equally extant.
Small businesses are seen
as members of the “people,” whereas foreign corporations and politicians who
are accused for not taxing them enough are characterised as members of the “elite.”
The YVM's usage of capital letters when referring to prominent corporations
emphasises its criticism of these institutions even more. The YVM's contention
that France's debt should be paid by the 80 billion lost in financial scams and
not by the poor, demonstrates the same expansive constructions.
One may discern hints of
the common-sense rhetoric that typically characterises populism in several of
these demands: that the wealthy pay more than the poor[15]. Furthermore, the YVM
appears to indicate that political and financial elites, rather than “pure”
people, are too responsible for France's economic shortcomings, notably
billions wasted in fraud, thereby linguistically contrasting the “out-group”
with “the group.”
The slogans inscribed on
the jackets of thousands of demonstrators in the YVM, such as “[we are] just
here for a more just world”[16] and “we want to live,
not just survive,” amplify this sense of moral anger[17].
Therefore, it is contended
that Aslanidis' second populist criterion, namely, that a movement aspires to
reform an entire democratic system to better serve “pure and moral people,” is
met. The fulfilment of Aslanidis' first criterion—the question of who the PSM
professes to represent—is, on the other hand, tougher to prove.
As previously stated,
Aslanidis' first criterion for a PSM is that it claims to speak for “people” as
a whole, not only for specific groups of people, such as women, LGBTQ+ people,
or workers. What distinguishes PSMs from other movements, according to
Aslanidis, is framing, specifically the catch-all rhetoric used by movement
entrepreneurs. Although Aslanidis primarily offers the largely progressive and
left-leaning anti-austerity movements as examples, this can happen on all sides
of the political spectrum.
These movements
overwhelmingly targeted monetarist and political elites as their “out-group,”
politicising “[..] citizen identity into a collective identity of a moral
People that comprises an overwhelming majority, against which stand the corrupt
forces of a tiny minority of elites,” in the words of Aslanidis[18].
Politically, the YVM is
more difficult to identify than these groups, which have developed a rhetoric
in which “people” primarily critique political and financial elites “at the top”[19] [20] [21].
The “people” in the YVM's
discourse are of a distinct type, as it distinguishes itself not only from the
"top" of the social hierarchy, but also from "out-groups"
at the bottom. Indeed, the YVM makes protectionist demands that could be seen
as anti-immigration. The 42 demands, for example, indicate that the YVM wants
to impose “an actual system for political integration" and that living
in France "entails becoming French (classes in French language,
history, and civic education with a certification at the end of the track).”
This criterion implies that inhabitants of France who do not possess particular linguistic and cultural skills are not deemed French. Thereby, it clearly demonstrates the development of a “group” and an “out-group” through language. A similar trend can be seen in requests for the elimination of postal work, which will mostly affect workers from the European Union's poorer countries, or in the allegation that rejected asylum seekers should be sent back to their home countries. All these claims are made in the name of a “group” of immigrants and French nationals of origin who adhere to tight integration standards. Hence, the demands imply and target a “outgroup”- migrants, immigrants who fail to meet required integration requirements, and foreign labour.
Rogers Brubaker, a
sociologist, has attempted to analyse the difference between populist rhetoric
aimed at elites “on the top” and populist discourse aimed at elites “on the
top” and “out-groups” on the “bottom”. According to his description, the
European Indignados and Occupy Wall Street are examples of the former, as they
engage in discourse with a single enemy, the elite. The YVM's demands, on the
other hand, appear to include aspects of “triadic” populism, which divides
society into two antagonists: “the elite” at the top and the “out-group” at the
bottom[22]. Brubaker explains this occurrence
in the following manner in an assessment of Cas Mudde’s definition of populism,
which according to him is too narrowly fixated on populism’s criticism of
elites, and is not sufficiently aware of the targeting of “out-groups” at the
bottom:
“‘The people’ can be
defined not only in relation to those on top but also [. . .] in relation to those
on the bottom. Those on the bottom may be represented as parasites or spongers,
as addicts or deviants, as disorderly or dangerous, as undeserving of benefits
and unworthy of respect, and thus as not belonging to the so-called decent,
respectable, “normal,” hard working ‘people.’ The downward focus of populist
anger and resentment has been much less widely discussed than the upward focus.
But it should not be neglected, especially since the upward and downward orientations
are often closely connected: those on top are often blamed for being overly
solicitous of those on the bottom.”[23]
Many right-wing populist
parties in Europe, like the National Rally, have a history of ostracising
people “on the bottom” (Rassemblement national). The National
Rally's language also tends to relate the elites “at the top” to the masses “at
the bottom,” condemning mainstream parties for being unduly welcoming to
immigrants, particularly France's Muslim population[24]. The YVM looks to
be more “triadic” than the anti-austerity groups that Aslanidis uses as
displays for his description of PSMs, even though the targeting of individuals
"on the bottom" is significantly less visible in comparison to the
National Rally.
Unlike the anti-austerity
movements, the YVM's language appears to work with two rhetorical
"outgroups," not one. De Cleen and Stavrakakis, both populist theorists
who, like Aslanidis and Brubaker, adhere to a discursive definition of
populism, have criticised Brubaker's idea of triadic populism. When
characterising triadic populism, Brubaker conflates nationalism with populism,
and so moves beyond the confines of populist logic. They
maintain that:
“[p]opulism is a
dichotomic discourse in which “the people” are juxtaposed to” the elite” along the
lines of a down/up antagonism in which “the people” is discursively constructed
as a large powerless group through opposition to “the elite” conceived as a
small and illegitimately powerful group.”[25]
According to them,
populism as a notion should be viewed solely as a discursive form, as the
conflation of many sets of grievances via a “chain of equivalence,” and should
be studied separately from the political content of this discourse[26].
“[...] something
positive they have in common, but [the fact and/or impression] that they are
all frustrated and endangered by 'the elite'" binds the “people”.” [27]
According to their
definition, populist logic is always dualistic and entirely concerned with the
establishment of a vertical antagonism between the “elite” and the “people.” Any
references to an out-group “at the bottom” of the social order, such as
immigration, are political substance, not populist logic, in their opinion. As
a result, they claim, allusions to “out-groups,” or what Brubaker refers to as
populism's horizontal component, are examples of nationalist content that
should not be confounded with populism analytically.
In actual political
discourse, however, de Cleen and Stavrakakis (2020: 315) admit that populism
and nationalism are frequently blended and interwoven. Their thesis is that
these events should be viewed as distinct entities. De Cleen and Stavrakakis
write that their understanding of populism and nationalism as distinct entities
is informed by a large body of scholarly work published over the last 50 years
that conflates nationalism and populism, resulting in populism being almost
entirely associated with the radical right, especially in popular culture. According
to them, this is misleading because many of Europe's major radical right
parties, such as the National Rally, depend more heavily on nationalist and
authoritarian speech than populist discourse.
Aslanidis' definition of
populism for PSMs is similar to that of De Cleen and Stavrakakis, in that he
agrees with Laclau that:
“a movement is not
populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual contents identifiable
as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those
contents—whatever those contents are.”[28]
Aslanidis, like de Cleen and
Stavrakakis, aims to make populism a conceptually strict concept that only
refers to a “particular logic of articulation of content,” not to a specific
political substance, in several of his essays on the subject. Their shared goal
is to be able to quantify and compare populism while avoiding geographical,
policy, and normative biases[29].
This very study agrees
with Aslanidis, De Cleen, and Stavrakakis that a discursive definition of
populism should adhere to a rigid logic of articulation rather than content in
a discursive classification. The discursive definition avoids many of the
normative and political traps that populist discussions frequently fall into,
allowing researchers to investigate populism as a discursive repertory that
nearly all political actors use to some extent. A minimum discursive definition
of populism that “travels well” and is less prone to ideological and political
biases is useful and needed.
As a result, while the
anti-austerity movements and the YVM differ in many ways, these differences are
political rather than discursive, and so have no bearing on whether Aslanidis'
definition of PSMs applies to the YVM. Aslanidis' definition is completely
anti-essentialist and formalist, as is the Laclauian tradition in which he
finds himself. The only question posed by the concept is to what extent the
conflict between the "people" and the "elite" transcends
other conflicts. Therefore, one would suggest that the YVM should be classified
given a PSM under this theoretical framework, as it employs the logic of
articulation mentioned by Aslanidis. Is Aslanidis' definition of PSMs
compatible with the YVM?
Yes, it does, because the
conflict between the “people” and the “elite” dominates the YVM's discourse to
a considerable extent. However, as previously stated, the YVM is not the same
as the anti-austerity movements used by Aslanidis to illustrate the PSM
definition. Within Aslanidis' theoretical framework, these discrepancies have
no bearing on whether a movement is populist or not, because populism is a
logic of articulation, a language, and not an objective ideology. The reality
remains, however, that the YVM is distinct from anti-austerity groups, and the
question is how, or rather whether, we can recognise and communicate this
distinction within Aslanidis' theoretical outline, which shall be examined subsequently
in this paper.
Brubaker's attempt to define a
"triadic" populism is typical of scholarly discontent with the
vacuousness of Aslanidis, De Cleen, and Stavrakakis' plain discursive description
of populism. The rhetorical manufacture of hostility between the “pure and
sovereign people” and the “corrupt elites” is demonstrated by the examination
of the 42 demands. However, stating that alone will leave many of the key
dynamics in play in the YVM unmentioned. In what follows, this paper disputes
the explanatory capacity of a discursive definition and suggest that, in order
to be truly instructional, it must be supplemented by structural explanations,
which involves abandoning the expansive definition of populism.
Furthermore, this paper contends that the
42 requests show that the YVM is not solely a negative movement opposed to a “corrupt
elite”; rather, the demands highlight common political and economic objectives
among the YVM. A discursive definition of populism, on the other hand, cannot
explain these shared interests because it would necessitate examining political
content rather than language, as well as political and economic systems. Aslanidis
defends a discursive definition of populism by writing:
“[w]hile
lessons from resource mobilization, political opportunity, and rational choice
theory remain useful in couching causal inferences within a more general
theory, nevertheless, a specific mechanism of identity construction explains
much of what takes place in PSMs and deserves our privileged attention.”[30]
According to Aslanidis, structural aspects
cannot explain the emergence or non-emergence of populism because there exist scenarios
where comparable structures have not resulted in the emergence of a populist
movement or party:
“Grievances
therefore supply a necessary backdrop but do not constitute sufficient factors,
being generally ubiquitous and unable to automatically generate mobilization.
Economic malaise, a surge in anti-immigration sentiment, or the general
discomfort from globalization, can potentially provide a substrate for populist
agitation, but aggrieved populations do not take to the streets in a
deterministic fashion. [. . .] Grievances remain latent until they become
subject to a process of strategic interpretation by politically savvy movement
entrepreneurs who sense a ripe moment for their agenda. [. . .] When this
mobilization adopts the distinct nature of populist logic, grievances are
discursively aggregated and collectively articulated as outcomes of an
underlying social division between “people” and “elites”.”[31]
Consequently, he claims,
populist mobilisation is caused by movement entrepreneurs' populist framing,
and this subject “deserves our privileged attention.” Aslanidis makes a strong
case for why a populist frame allows for populist mobilisation. However, this
populist framing merits our “special attention,” as the author claims, because
it fails to adequately describe or explain the events it attempts to capture. This
is an epistemological flaw in the discourse analysis theoretical framework,
which focuses solely on language and ignores how discourse and structure
interact. One feature of the 42 demands of the YVM that sticks out is that some
of them are more targeted and tailored to specific segments of the French
population than others.
The 42 requests are not a
list of a haphazard and arbitrary selection of concerns equally relevant for
all demographic groups, even though they can be described as a combination of
progressive and regressive ideas. Certain themes, such as more taxes and less
benefits for the upper middle and upper classes, as well as a call for greater
decentralising policy, are easily discernible. More limits on big company in
terms of taxation, the employment of detached workers, and temporary positions
are also being advocated. On the contrary, the list demands that jobless
people, retirees, and low-wage workers be given more rights.
All of this is part of
the movement entrepreneurs' clever structuring of the antagonism between the “pure
people” and the “corrupt elite,” according to Aslanidis' description. That may
be true, but beyond from providing yet another example of a certain
articulation logic, what does that truly teach us? Such an approach blinds us
to the interactions between political and economic systems on the one hand, and
the YVM discourse on the other. To comprehend the YVM, we must first ask: who
are “the people” referred to in the YVM's demands, and what do the people who retort
to this discourse have in common?
The field of social
movement studies has immensely contributed to the field of populism studies, as
it has driven on espousing actor-oriented theories and structure-oriented philosophies
of social mobilization for decades. David Snow et al. describe this in the
following manner:
“[. . .] our
understanding of social movements will be advanced if more attention is devoted,
both theoretically and empirically, to how framing intersects with the issues
and processes examined via the theoretical lens of resource mobilization,
political opportunity, and cultural perspectives. These perspectives should be
seen not so much as competing but as addressing different aspects of the
character and dynamics of social movements. The framing perspective emerged not
as an alternative to other perspectives on social movements, but to investigate
and illuminate what these other perspectives have glossed over, namely, the matter
of the production of mobilizing and counter-mobilizing meanings and ideas
(David Snow et al., 2018: 405).”
Framing cannot be considered in isolation from other approaches to social mobilisation; it must be one of several approaches that target a specific feature of a mobilisation. Furthermore, frame analysis must be supported by “[..] direct attention to the cultural contexts in which movements are embedded [..].” Aslanidis' concept of PSMs makes this problematic because it is only concerned with a logic of articulation, not content. In Aslanidis' definition, language takes precedence over culture, context, and structure in the study of PSMs[32].
“What is at stake is
the problem of the articulation of a structurally given latent potential by a political
organization [in particular by a political party]. The potentials are
structurally given, i.e., they are not created by the party. The preferences of
the voters change due to processes of social change that cannot be controlled
by political organizations.”[33]
Thus, one must move away
from a purely discursive definition of the YVM and toward a structural
analysis that nevertheless recognizes the importance of agency, culture,
and language. The social movement scholar Greg Martin describes this dual focus
in the following manner when commenting on Charles Tilly’s work on “repertoires
of action”:
“‘repertoire’ not only
constrains collective action, for it combines structure and agency—choices are
made—but “within structured options,” thus leaving room for agency and
strategic decision making while acknowledging the cultural and historical
circumstances constraining choice.”[34]
Since the discursive
method implies that antagonism arises irrespective of political content, it is
uninterested in, and has no understanding of, how the “people” expresses a
variety of distinct but related grievances from various groups. In the demands
of the YVM, the “people” is not a homogeneous or easily identifiable group, but
it is not simply any group, any people.
Although antagonism in
principle may bring together a wide range of complaints as opposed to the “out-group,”
there are still some restrictions on what demands should be included. The YVM's
list has a wide range of expectations, but it's tough to claim that they are
principally those of a mid-level public servant in Paris, an entrepreneur, or
an investment banker. To cite one of Aslanidis' examples from his work on PSMs,
the Occupy Wall Street movement was not dominated by middle-aged housewives
from the Midwest. The discursive definition of populism and PSMs has a flaw in
that it lacks vocabulary to express these demographic inequalities. The
anti-austerity movements and the YVM were both heterogeneous, but their
heterogeneity was made up of quite distinct demographic groups.
As a result, this paper has
no objections to Aslanidis' use of framing theory to explain PSMs, because
framing theory's dual emphasis on agency and structure is quite pertinent when attempting
to explain phenomena like the YVM. Instead, this project attempts to comprehend
this issue with the discursive and expansive explanation of populism, which fails
to define or understand many of the mechanisms at work in social mobilisation.
This paper hence posits
that the “people” are not united by “something positive they share, but [the
fact and/or impression] that they are all frustrated and threatened by ‘the
elite’” [35].
Certainly, the populist framework may obscure many of the disparities that
exist among the “people,” allowing mobilisation to take place. However, in
order for this to occur, the “people” must share some shared interests, which
are enabled by society structures, which is a material reality. This awareness
compels us to abandon the popular concept of populism.
In the final leg of this
project, an outline to some of the common interests that can be found in the
YVM's demands and an analysis to how they can explain the movement's emergence
is put forth. More precisely, this research points to two societal structures,
namely, the political opportunity structure and economic conditions, as
possible explanations for the YVM's formation.
Discourse research
emphasises a movement's vocally expressed outputs rather than its nonverbal
acts. The YVM's nonverbal acts were a major part of it. Taking control of the
Arc de Triomphe, occupying roundabouts, setting fire to the famous, luxurious,
and celebrity-filled restaurant Fouquet's in Paris, destroying bank and
real-estate agency windows while leaving independent shops alone[36], and destroying windows
of banks and real-estate agencies while leaving independent shops alone are all
highly symbolic actions that are problematic to analyse when using a discursive
analytical approach.
Furthermore, analysing
discourse frequently includes prioritising the role of leaders and famous
personalities, which, in turn, frequently means prioritising educated or
articulated members of a movement above others. Privilege of speech is
especially difficult in the case of the YVM, because the movement's
horizontality makes it strenuous to determine whether a leader's or
spokespeople's language is reflective of the movement.
Supporters of the discursive approach to populism claim that the populist mythos includes an insistence on horizontality and rejection of representation, and that in fact, there will always be persons who play more significant roles than others and whose discourse can be studied[37]. However, recent empirical studies of the YVM reveal that horizontality, rejection of representation, and the resulting level of disorder are all traits that cannot be overstated in the YVM[38]. Therefore, the YVM instance indicates that using a discursive approach to populism without adding other aspects to the study, as done in the following section of this paper, may prove to be methodologically challenging.
Although
the YVM's originality and popularity shocked French society when it erupted in
the fall of 2018, its significance cannot be compared to the arguably far
larger tremors that occurred only 18 months prior, notably Emmanuel Macron's
election and his La République en Marche! This research would like to maintain
that the victory of Macron established a political opportunity structure that
positioned the YVM for expansion, leaving behind the discursive justifications
for the YVM's coming together. One of Macron's primary campaign arguments was
that the political right/left divide had outlived its usefulness, and that the
new political cleavage was between "backwards-looking conservatives"
and “progressive reformers”[39]. He chastised both the
conventional left, which he saw as too focused on those who already had work
and too opposed to Europeanization and globalisation, and the extreme right,
which he saw as overly nationalist and anti-immigrant[40].
The political opportunity
approach undertakes that a mobilization takes place in a “situation in which
institutions are [and are perceived to be] particularly closed towards citizens”
demands, at the same time unwilling and incapable of addressing them in an inclusive
way”[41]. One way to look at the
YVM is to see it as an amalgamation of the parts of France that President
Macron disowned in his presidential campaign, as a repercussion of the
“reactionaries.” Cleavage theory, which views a national party system as a
result of underlying social conflicts, would consider the YVM as a part of the political
cleavage between the “losers” and “winners” of globalization.
It is fair to claim that
Macron's election, with his more neoliberal ideas, exacerbated this political
divide[42]. The YVM's 42 demands are
in direct opposition to Macron's project; whereas the YVM was concerned with
rural and peri urban areas, protectionist policies, fewer short-term contracts,
increased taxes for the wealthy and major corporations, and strengthened
welfare benefits. Macron's electoral message focused on strengthening Europe,
cutting capital gain taxes to stimulate investment, reducing public spending,
and eliminating worker protection.
Hence, the appearance and
demands of YVM might be regarded as an indication of a developing political
division between diverse political interests or perceived political interests,
rather than a merely negative discursive fabrication of a "people"
unified exclusively by their antagonism to Macron.
The “losers” of
globalization theory and an emphasis on diverging political interests guide us
onto an examination that views the YVM as an example and a result of
developments in class structure in post-industrial societies[43]. This is the path
envisaged by social movement expert Donatella Della Porta in her study on the
populist anti-austerity movements Aslanidis refers to. She outlines how these
movements took place in countries characterised by public budget cuts, deterioration
of public services, rising disparities and poverty. Della Porta connects
anti-austerity movements to the new globalisation divide between “winners” and “losers,”
and wonders if the “losers” are a new class made up of disillusioned young
people, blue-collar workers, pensioners, and public servants who are forming a
collective identity as “precarious” or “the 99 percent”.[44]
The work of Della Portas
on anti-austerity movements is in line with that of numerous notable French
scholars (such as Bantigny et al., 2019; Dupeux, 2019; Geisser, 2019). They
consider the YVM as an example of modern society's expanding of what comprises
the working class, as opposed to industrial societies, when the working class
was defined as workers who did not own the means of production, as posited by
traditional Marxist theory[45]. Ludivine Bantigny, a
historian, defines this widening of the meaning of class as follows:
“Personally, I think that the YVM has
manifested a class consciousness. We are a long way from class as defined by
not possessing the means of production. But we are well within the realms of an
identity claim and of a socio-economical conflict centered around the
distribution of wealth.”[46]
One can perceive from the
above summary of the YVM's demands that the YVM's criticism is mostly directed
at financial fraud, bad working conditions, and low salaries. According to
Fischbach the YVM's desire to expand public services and combat privatisation,
a trend that is evident in the demands, is an example of class consciousness[47]. In her account of
anti-austerity movements, Della Porta comes close to the same analysis:
“In sum, while
multi-class, the various protest campaigns are not interclass. Rather, they
tend to reflect some of the changes in class structure that have characterized
neoliberalism and its crisis: in particular, the proletarization of the middle
classes and the precarization of workers.”[48]
As Fischbach does with
the YVM, Della Porta emphasises the class base of anti-austerity movements. The
late-capitalist dynamics highlighted by Della Porta are pertinent to both the
YVM and the anti-austerity movements. Based on this research’s analysis of the
YVM's assertions, we contend that it is difficult to disregard the class
awareness expressed in the demands. The vast majority of the YVM's demands are
material, rather than cultural, in nature, and the YVM reflects a
reconfiguration of the lower-middle and working classes. A discursive
definition of populism readily overlooks this truth. We therefore believe that
the definition of a PSM must go beyond a post-Marxist framework and into the
growing new material class conflicts that groups like the YVM symbolise. Barker
et al. describe this change in the following way when discoursing the
anti-austerity movements:
“[. . .] the situation is paradoxical.
On the one hand, we are witnessing an exhilarating new flourishing of movement
activity, a slowly resurgent opposition to the onslaughts of neoliberalism in
crisis by a globally expanded and recomposed working class, and the expression
of widely popular ideological challenges to the fundamental principles of capitalist
society. On the other hand, this is, perhaps, the first time since 1848 when specifically
Marxist ideas are not the natural lingua franca of a rising movement.”[49]
Thus, we reason that the
YVM is an example of what Barker et al. describe. The verity that Marxism is no
longer the lingua franca of social movements does not imply that the material
class conflicts have vanished.
To
summarise, this research suggests that when attempting to comprehend the rise
of the YVM, one must consider the political opportunity structure produced by President
Macron's election, as well as the reconfigurations of class structures inside the
French society. To be precise, the YVM appears to be an example of
"populist framing," and that this framing aided in the formation of a
common identity that facilitated the movement's mobilisation.
However,
because of structural constraints, this framing was oriented at specific groups
who have common interests and experiences. To figure out what these
commonalities are, one needs to divert their attention at the substance of the
YVM's 42 requests, and not only its articulation logic, as Aslanidis suggests. Our
“privileged attention” to the populist framing of the YVM causes us to ignore
some of the key forces at play in the YVM.
This,
in our humble view, is an epistemological flaw in the discursive definition of
populism, which fails to recognise the relationship between structures and
agency that allows for popular mobilisation. This paper examined whether the
YVM matches Paris Aslanidis' description of PSMs and found that it does so
within the discursive theoretical framework.
However, it has also criticised the explanatory capacity of a discursive definition of populism and called for the study of political content as a means of discovering similar interests generated by political and societal structures among PSM participants. Thus, this research proposes that in order to explain mobilisation, a theory of PSMs must consider political and economic institutions, as well as human agency, framing, and communal identity. A discursive approach to populism, which exclusively considers language, is therefore not sufficient to explain populist social movements such as the YVM.
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Very informative!
ReplyDeleteVery well written
ReplyDeleteVery well researched
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